Discretionary Non-Prosecution under Procuratorial Integration: Practice and Institutional Responses
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.66069/ojspub.25360611Keywords:
Procuratorial integration, Judicialization of procuratorial power, Administrativeization of procuratorial power, Prosecutorial independence, Discretionary non-prosecutionAbstract
Procuratorial integration has both administrative and judicial dimensions. Its administrative dimension is characterized by command, unity, and initiative, whereas its judicial dimension is marked by independence, direct personal engagement, and passivity. In judicial practice, the discretionary power not to prosecute has long failed to perform its intended function, and two tensions arise between that power and the requirements of procuratorial integration: first, the conflict between the judicialized independent exercise of authority and the administrative demand for the unified deployment of procuratorial power; and second, the contradiction between the requirement that authority be exercised through direct personal engagement and the command-based operation of procuratorial power. The prosecutorial system should therefore be improved in two respects: by safeguarding prosecutors' independent exercise of the discretionary power not to prosecute, and by appropriately limiting administrative commands within the procuratorial system.
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