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Are You A Person: A Comparative Study of Posthuman Personhood in "Artificially Manufactured Persons" in 21st-Century Science Fiction

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Abstract: ***From the perspective of posthumanist discourse, this paper delves into the possibility of "artificially manufactured persons" for having personhood, as well as the emergent posthumanist paradigm of human-machine relationality as depicted in the speculative narratives of The Windup Girl, Ancillary Justice, and All Systems Red. Within the posthumanist paradigm shift, the demarcation between the human and the non-human is problematized, leading to a nuanced intermingling of these categories. The narratives in question illustrate the assertion of personhood by non-human entities, such as "artificially manufactured persons," which is met with anthropocentric resistance, precipitating acrimonious discord. This study will scrutinize the criteria for ascribing personhood to artificial persons. Furthermore, it will investigate the root causes and potential strategies for mitigating human-machine complexities, with the aim of elucidating innovative pathways toward the establishment of an autopoietic posthuman society.)***

Keywords: Posthumanism; Personhood; 21st-century science fiction.

1. INTRODUCTION

A wide range of discussions on posthumanism is already well underway. Recently, with the various interventions of human bodies resulting from the flourishing development of artificial intelligence, biotechnology, etc., the diversity of posthumans, like enhanced humans and genetically modified humans, is continuously growing. N. Katherine Hayles and Donna Haraway's prophecy of blurring boundaries between humans is further confirmed. Under these circumstances, the imagination and portrayal of different kinds of "artificially manufactured persons" (Wennemann, 2013, p. 94) in science fiction is progressively advancing, and the disruptions over whether "artificially manufactured persons" have personhood have escalated.

Since the revival of Aristotelianism during the Renaissance, humanists have defined the human as the center of the universe and the measure of all things (Rivkin and Ryan, 2017, p. 1420). Humanism separated human life from nature and posited nature as a troubling other that needed to be tamed or controlled to accommodate the needs of civil human society (Rivkin and Ryan. 2017, p. 1421). Posthumanism begins by deconstructing the foundational humanist concept of the "human" and challenges anthropocentrism and the notion of human superiority, dismantling the arrogance of humanity (Chen Shidan, 2023, p. 212). The term "posthumanism" was initially proposed by Ihab Hassan. In "Prometheus as Performer: Towards a Posthumanist Culture?" (1977), he posits that "We need to understand that five hundred years of humanism may be coming to an end, as humanism transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call posthumanism" (Hassan, 1977, p. 843). This indicates that a radical change in the human form has taken place and the traditional understanding of humanity needs to be revisioned and redefined. Since then, philosophers and scholars addressed this term from various directions.

N. Katherine Hayles further explains posthuman in *How We Became Posthuman* (1999). Hayles considers this term a point of view that is notably characterized by configuring human beings "so that it can be seamlessly articulatedwith intelligent machines" (1999, 3). She points out that in the posthuman era, "there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot technology and human goals" (Hayles, 1999, 3). This opening angle pushes beyond the posthuman recognition of the fusion of artificial and biological consciousness and the symbiotic relationship between cyborgs and humans, thus facilitating the posthuman transformation of human bodies and consciousness.

In *What Is Posthumanism?* (2010), Cary Wolfe introduces Luhmann's system theory, especially the "openness from closure" principle in explaining posthumanism, which believes that the "internal complexity made possible

by autopoietic closure" (2010, p. xxiv). Wolfe believes that from the perspective of posthumanism, the interactions between people and technology make people and society not linear or unidirectional but interwoven and constantly evolving. He said posthuman can not simply regarded as an extension of the human; instead, it breaks through "the dialectic of control and lack of control, superhuman and inhuman, must be premised upon a mutation that is ongoing and immanent" (Wolfe, 2010, p. xviii), which means the posthuman condition is not fixed or static but continuous, evolving process that occurs within the autopoietic and complex human bodies and the society.

As the term suggests, "posthuman" refers to human or non-human entities, which include things that people usually admit are lifeless and "artificially manufactured persons" that exist in a state beyond humanity. In science fiction, the posthuman is typically not a result of natural evolution but rather emphasizes how science and technology interrupt the natural evolutionary process, triggering radical transformations in the human's body and mental status, blurring the boundaries between "human" and "non-human." All the above concepts and theory proposed by the posthumanists show their efforts to discard anthropocentrism, examine the human-machine relationship with an open mind. However, all the above theorists do not discuss the possibility of artificial persons possessing personhood. "Personhood is the status of being a person" (Taylor, 1985, p. 97), and capacities or attributes of personhood commonly include agency, self-awareness, a notion of the past and future, and the possession of rights and duties, etc. (Taylor, 1985, p. 101). Since the boundary between humans and "artificially manufactured persons" is blurred, how to define non-human entities may also possess personhood deserve attention.

In the era of posthumanism, non-human entities have been brought to the stage. "The moral community is conceived as potentially including genetically altered human beings, robots, computers, and aliens (should they exist)" (Wennemann, 2013, p. 6). It is possible for "artificially manufactured persons" to have personhood and qualify as a person. Moreover, if this presumption comes true, humans also have moral, legal or other obligations towards them.

By setting three "artificially manufactured persons," Breq, Emiko, and the Murderbot, as main characters who show traits like self-awareness, emotions, and moral decision-making, etc., these three scientific fictions, *The Windup Girl* (2009), *Ancillary Justice* (2013), and *All Systems Red* (2017) mainly expand the circle of moral concern beyond the human beings. They delve into the possibility of artificial persons having personhood and envision the future patterns of human-machine interaction.

The Windup Girl is American science fiction writer Paolo Bacigalupi's debut novel, which has won several prestigious science fiction literary awards, including the Nebula Award, the John W. Campbell Memorial Award, and the Hugo Award. The novel is set in a future world facing environmental disasters and global resource depletion. Global warming has caused the sea level to rise, and Thailand is one of the few countries that have not been submerged. Emiko is one of the novel's protagonists, a genetically engineered windup, who struggled in a state of oppression and enslavement for so long, seeking the freedom she has longed for. *Ancillary Justice*, which was awarded both the Hugo Award and the Nebula Award, is the debut novel by American author Ann Leckie. The story is set in a futuristic galactic empire: the Radch Empire, where does not distinguish between genders, and "she" is used as the universal singular pronoun. This story revolves around-the vengeance of the protagonist, Breq, who is one of the twenty ancillary soldiers of the starship *Justice of Toren*. *All Systems Red* is a science fiction written by Martha Wells, which won two international awards, the Hugo Award and Nebula Award, in 2018. The narrator is an artificially manufactured person constructed from mechanical and artificial biological materials who calls itself "Murderbot." It tells the story of a mission during which it shared hardships with humans.

In these novels, moral characteristics like consciousness and self-motivation, which are supposed to belong to human beings, now appearing on "artificially manufactured persons." Thus, this article will analyze the possibilities of artificial persons possessing moral personhood and explore the reasons behind the conflicts between humans and "artificially manufactured persons" in these three novels to trigger people's contemplation on how humans can live with beings traditionally regarded as "the others."

2. THE POSTHUAMN PERSONHOOD: THE BURSTING HUMAN-MACHINE BOUNDS

In the posthuman context, the distinction between human and non-human entities seems to be continuously ceasing, as the application of the Turing Test suggests (Winner, 2005, p. 29). In 1950, the artificial intelligence pioneer Alan Turing, a British mathematician, logician, and computer scientist, proposed a test to assess whether a

machine can think akin to humans. The essence of the Turing Test is to judge whether the machine has intelligence and can "simulate human behavior, particularly in language and reasoning, to the extent that it becomes indistinguishable from a human" (Winner, 2005, p. 29). Such phenomenon triggers scholars' thinking. Donna J. Haraway believes that the existence of cyborgs is an opportunity to dissolve traditional boundaries between subjects and objects, owing to the "cyborg" representing a hybrid entity that deliberately blurs distinctions (e.g., organism and machine, nature and culture, male and female), offering a way to overcome the conflicts inherent in identity politics related to race, gender, and class while fostering a pluralistic, heterogeneous community. This concept challenges traditional views of the body and introduces a human-machine interaction. N. Katherine Hayles, in *How We Became Posthuman* (1999), proposes "there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot technology and human goals" (1999, p. 3). Greatly inspired by N. Katherine Hayles, Andy Clark assumes that tools are not just external props and aids but are deep and integral parts of human beings; thus, humans are "natural born cyborgs" (2003, p. 8). All these arguments confirm the bursting boundaries between humans and artificial beings, but they raise the question of how we can determine whether artificial beings possess moral personhood or not.

The traditional restriction of personhood to humans primarily results in the genetic perspective on personhood. However, the biological structure of artificial persons is inherently different from humans, limiting the scope of personhood to humans is a human-centered and ontological concept that overlooks the diversity and openness of personhood. Thus, the bandwidth of "personhood" should be broadened, a new criteria for evaluating whether artificial persons possess personhood need to be established, and scholars from various fields have proposed diverse perspectives on personhood.

In contemporary bioethics, the concept of "personhood" originated from debates on the morality of abortion. In her work "On the moral and legal status of abortion," Mary Anne Warren studies personhood from the standpoint of morality. She notes a distinction between a genetic human being and a moral human being, the latter being a full-fledged member of the moral community (Warren, 1996, p. 435). She argues that zygote, fetus, the comatose, and people who have Alzheimer's are not "persons" because they do not meet the basic criteria for personhood as follows. In contrast, biologically non-human entities may qualify (Warren, 1996, 436):

(1) Consciousness (of objects and events external and /or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain;

(2) Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems);

(3) Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control);

(4) The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics

(5) The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both.

These criterion reflects the openness of Warren's theory in defining personhood and moral community members, which transcends the traditional limitation of considering personhood solely based on biological humanity and invokes deeper reflection on the concept of personhood in the context of flourishing new technologies and social developments.

Charles Taylor emphasizes the individual who has personhood is a "respondent" (1985, p. 97) who can "respond to others and to its environment" (Gittinger, 2019, p. 23), and complements Warren's thoughts, particularly about the meaning of "consciousness" and "self-motivated activity" in his essay "The Concept of a Person" (1985). Taylor points out that Warren's definition of "consciousness" and "self-motivated activity" cannot distinguish whether it is a program, like Affective Computing, set by human beings to let the machine think or whether the machine does have consciousness and self-motivation. He defines "consciousness" as "a power to frame representations of things" (Taylor, 1985, p. 98), signifying that to prove a machine's consciousness needs to exemplify machine can think and represent things based on its own understandings. Moreover, verifying a machine's self-motivated activity requires substantiating that the action of the machine "is not controlled exclusively by genetics or by others, but controlled by the individual" (Gittinger, 2019, p. 23).

Daryl J. Wennemann also enriches Warren's moral definitions of personhood. He divides rationality into three

kinds: substantial rationality, instrumental or functional rationality and reflexive rationality. Among the three, reflexive rationality, which "pertains to the intelligent choice of ends or goals" (Wennemann, 2013, p. 106), is the most decisive condition to support a person who belongs to the moral community because reflexive rationality could confirm the real awareness of spiritual machines constructing rational goals. Wennemann acknowledges Warren's argument that though personhood is a characteristic of human beings in the biological sense, it may be extended to include nonhuman beings (2013, p. 41) And to better understand the terminology Warren wants to introduce, he separates the term "human" into "humanB", human beings in the biological sense, and "humanM", human beings in the moral sense (Wennemann, 2013, p. 42). Since it is unstoppable for human beings to be genetically altered or pharmacologically enhanced with the fast development of technologies, and some alternation or enhancement might be radical such as brain implants, anthropoMcentric is the thing that needs to be paid attention to, rather than anthropoBcentric (Wennemann, 2013, p. 109). Considering this, he appeals to a moral and ethical reflection on the uniqueness of human beings and a new kind of moral responsibility which will be applied to a new social and moral context.

Daryl J. Wennemann also distinguishes moral personhood from legal personhood. As Wennemann points out, moral beings are recognized as having the standing of persons within a moral community; legal personhood refers to any being that is recognized as having legal standing against other objects that may be treated as property (2013, p.6). In other words, legal personhood enables an entity to exercise legal rights while shouldering legal responsibility. Similar to Wennemann's opinion that the category of moral humanhood could be extended to nonhuman beings, Steven S. Kapica supplements that legal personhood (juridical person) represents "a jurisprudential attempt to accommodate and mediate situations where rights reserved for human agents can and/or should be extended to entities of nonhuman origin" (2014, p. 616).

According to the concept raised by Mary Anne Warren, Charles Taylor, and Daryl J. Wennemann, a being with moral personhood is an independent respondent, or humanM, who have traits like consciousness, reasoning (primarily reflexive rationality), self-motivation, the capacity to communicate, and self-awareness. Moreover, this being is also a member of the moral community and constantly interacting with surroundings. Thus, an artificially manufactured existence with the above qualities, to a large degree, can be regarded as a humanM with moral personhood. The artificial beings: Emiko from *The Windup Girl*, Breq from *Ancillary Justice*, and Murderbot from *All Systems Red*, each exhibit a profound trait of moral personhood.

In *The Windup Girl*, the story happens against the backdrop of Thailand's capital city, "City of Divine Beings" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 8), Bangkok. The windup or New Person is created by the Japanese biotechnology company through gene editing technology because of the shortage of laboring. To prevent the reproduction of more capable from posing an underlying threat to human beings, humans deprive New People of their fertility. Emiko is a genetically engineered windup girl designed to serve high-class clients as a personal secretary. She is programmed with specialized physical traits and an obedient gene extracted from Labradors to bend to human command. Except for the inner biological modification, trainers like Mizumi-sensei at the kaizen studio, through educational indoctrination, let all the young New People knelt in kimono and teach their lessons to serve their patron better. When Emiko dares disobey, the disapproving sting of Mizumi's tongue and lash will hurt her mentally and physically (Bacigalupi, 2009, p.240). Under the mental and genetic control of human beings, Emiko is imprisoned in the cage of obedience.

To acquire a temporary foreign business exemption, Emiko's owner brought her to Thailand. But considering a return dirigible ticket for a New Person too expensive, her owner abandoned her, leaving Emiko to suffer inhuman abuse in Bangkok. No one treats Emiko as a living human being but rather as a soulless "alien toy" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 36) and "animal" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p.37). Breathes shallowly through the pain is no stranger to Emiko.

Incidentally, Emiko learns from Anderson of a sanctuary for the windups in the genehacked North, where the windups do not have patrons or owners and are released with freedom and independence. Except for serving their master until being abandoned like trash, Emiko is aware a new way of life is extending an invitation to her. As Gittinger points out, "One becomes a respondent because things matter to an agent in a particular, significant, and original way—and not because it was programmed or created to fulfill a function for another being" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 24). Facing the suffering of constant abuse and isolation, Emiko shows her remarkable resilience. She breaks through the shackles of human genetic modification and others' control. She firstly begs for basic dignity and survival, but unfortunately, her beg incurs more humiliation and highlights the fact that she is treated as property rather than a person. She begins to deliberately repress her physiological instincts by practicing. and keeps running to push herself against the lashings of thousnds of "Mizumi-sensei."

At the end of the fiction, the destroyed locks and pumps sabotage the City of Divine. The city empties, and at times, Emiko suspects she is the only person living in the city (Bacigalupi, 2009, p.336). Human beings no longer control Emiko. She uses her wits and her physical advantage, "lives by scavenging and the hunt" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p.336), and navigates through the dangerous situations she encounters. On several occasions, Emiko encounters people "who prey on a lone girl's perceived weakness" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p.337). she protects herself by defeating them with with as much mercy. Though Emiko is not acknowledged by the human community, the ending implies the possibility of building a community of New People by developing a technology that uses her hair as a source of reproductive genes, enabling her offspring to have the ability to reproduce indefinitely. Emiko is a respondent who constantly adapting the dangerous and harsh environment and struggling for belong to a harmonious human-machine community. Thus, an artificially manufactured person with moral personhood leaps off the page.

The main character, Breq, is the only surviving fragment of the starship *Justice of Toren*'s twenty ancillaries after the ship is destroyed in a political betrayal led by the tyrannical Lord of the Radch, Anaander Mianaai. Ancillaries are conversed by prisoners, or the people from nations or planets conquered by the Radch Empire, whose bodies are forced to implant devices, and previous consciousness and identities are stripped in order to link to a ship's artificial intelligence. Though physically modified by human beings and spiritually controlled by AI system, from Breq's behavior and interior monologue, readers could uncover her personhood, her intense feelings and independent thinking as an conscious being with reflective rationality.

Anaander Mianaai has thousands of ancillary bodies. During her thousand years of ruling the empire, she split into tyrannical and civil factions and triggered internal contradictions because of the mutual suspicion between the two sides. Lieutenant Awn, deeply trusted and loved by her citizens, discovers this split and refuses to obey the command of the faction she deems evil. To Remove a thorn in her eyes and test Breq's loyalty through this order, Mianaai orders Breq to shoot Lieutenant Awn. Lieutenant Awn is not *Justice of Toren*'s favorite but is Breq's. Breq is grieved by the loss of her favorite captain and *Justice of Toren*, and sickened by the ruthless rule of Mianaai. The seed of revenge is planted in her heart, fostered, and spread, and goal of life. It could be said that Breq's quest for vengeance is the driving force of the entire novel. Moreover, Breq's special feeling towards Lieutenant Awn also signifies the potential split in the *Justice of Toren* before Mianaai destroys it. After the devastation of *Justice of Toren*, Breq naturally becomes a single body and an independent brain of the twenty fragments, but Breq constantly thinks, a sudden split is something that had always been possible, always potential, now did it go from potential to real, incontrovertible, irrevocable (Leckie, 2013, p. 207). The reason, Breq guesses, lies in her habit of singing. Each fragment of *Justice of Toren* will have its own task, thus interacting with and responding to different surroundings. Breq first sings to amuse one of her lieutenants, which later makes her different from all other units on the ship and becomes a unique existence. Breq's reflections, as seen throughout the fiction, indeed highlight her remarkable ability for critical thinking., She used to sing for others, now, she sings only for herself.

To get revenge successfully, Breq makes a detailed plan. She uses her intelligence and negotiation skills to establish alliances with people who detest the dictatorial rule of Anaander Mianaai and may help her achieve her goal; one of them is Seivarden Vendaai. Seivarden is a former high-ranking Radch officer of noble birth. Although Breq wants to take advantage of Seivarden Vendaai's identity to gain privileged rights in the following revenging process and attract Mianaai's attention, when she first meets the dying Seivarden and saves Seivarden in the snow, she thinks: "Sometimes I do not know why I do the things I do...not to have orders to follow from one moment. (Leckie, 2013, p. 1)" The reason for Breq to save Seivarden, a human who despised and irritated her, actually is much more complex than just using Seivarden as a tool for taking revenge. Otherwise, she would not regress to helping Seivarden but never left Seivarden alone. She keeps saying, "of all the officers I've served with, she was never one of my favorites" (Leckie, 2013, p. 197), but risked her life to save Seivarden time and again. Even when leaping off the glass bridges and the capacity of Breq's modified body is weakened, feeling the sharp pain is "louder, more immediate, than anything else" (Leckie, 2013, p. 200) she protects and yells to Seivarden: "Whatever you do... don't let go" (Leckie, 2013, p. 199). Breq's noble sense of morality and responsibility earned her the trust of humans, allowing her to exact her revenge and ultimately co-live with her human friends.

All Systems Red is narrated by an artificial person who names itself "Murderbot". At the same time, its human employers and colleagues call it "SecUnit" (Security Unit), which implies that at the novel's beginning, humans only recognize the instrumental properties of an artificially manufactured person. The "Imitative Human Bot Units are...partially constructed from cloned material" (Wells, 2017, p. 53) and partially "standard, generic human" (Wells, 2017, p. 21) and are designed to replace its clients performing dangerous tasks in high-risk environments to ensure the safety of human workers. It is supposed to obey the commander of HubSystem. However, Murderbot hacks HubSystem, freeing itself from its control system's surveillance and becoming an independent and conscious

subject. When commands fill its feed, the Murderbot will ignore the governor's instructions to defend "the stupid company" (Wells, 2017, p. 48), and it also refuses to download and apply an upgrade packet from the governor modules. However, without the control of human beings, the Murderbot also makes appropriate decisions, saving people from danger.

Murderbot refers to itself as a "heartless killing machine" (Wells, 2017, p. 9) who prefers immersing itself in the movies, serials, books, plays, and music in the entertainment channels. It downloaded seven hundred hours of entertainment programming since it landed on an undeveloped planet to survey this planet with the members of PreservationAux. Murderbot thinks "murderbot + actual human = awkwardness" (Wells, 2017, p. 21), as it does not know how to meet human social expectations and has suffered by the otherization as a property of its possessors. It tries its best to avoid interacting with humans, like wearing a helmet to escape human gaze. It likes the imaginary people on the entertainment feed way more than real ones, but the Murderbot confesses, "You can't have one without the other. (Wells, 2017, p. 117)" the Murderbot hates people's arrogance and rudeness but is touched by their unrestrained creativity genuine concern. During an investigation, Murderbot accidentally uncovers a crisis that could threaten its team members. However, it is willing to sacrifice itself to bring the possibility of survival to its human companions who regard it as a team member, even it becomes an independent subject and has no responsibility to protect people. After Doctor Mensah purchases Murderbot from SecUnit's company, it thus becomes a "free agent" (Wells, 2017, p. 145). Murderbot likes its human companions. However, it does not want "to pretend to be an augmented human, and that would be a strain" (Wells, 2017, p. 147). It does not prefer to change and does things it does not want to do. It knows the objective difference between itself and humans, and it will never bend its will to emerge in a community that does not belong to it. After consideration, it says, "I don't want anyone to tell me what I want, or to make decisions for me" (Wells, 2017, p. 149). Murderbot chooses to leave for freedom and finds its own belongings, though, in the current stage, it does not know what it wants; it is more willing to believe in the opportunities in the unknown explored by itself.

Thus, these three kinds of "artificially manufactured persons" are constructed differently, but all show reflexive rationality when they make decisions while optimally utilizing available resources. As N. Katherine Hayles points out that "personhood" is "deeply integrated with taking responsibility" (1999, p. 1211), sometimes they will subconsciously make unwise choices out of responsibility, which highlights their moral personhood. At the same time, Emiko, Breq and the Murderbot also have complex feelings towards humans during their interaction with human beings. They take into account the thoughts of their companions yet remain independent, persisting in finding a community which can fully accept and embrace them. All of the above is grounded in self-motivation, not programmed by external forces, which fully echoes the characteristics of moral personhood defined by scholars of this field like Mary Anne Warren, Charles Taylor, and Daryl J. Wennemann.

3. THE WOE OF HUMAN-POSTHUMAN CONFLICTS: THE OTHER DILEMMA DOMINATED BY ANTHROPOCENTRIC PERSONHOOD

"Artificially manufactured persons," while being endowed by humans with enhanced capabilities surpassing human beings, simultaneously are subjected to various technological constraints to prevent them from threatening human-centeredness. This phenomenon reveals humans' ontological and paradoxical mentality: on the one hand, humans are eager to enhance the capacities of "artificially manufactured persons" to fulfill their needs; on the other hand, they are vigilant toward the unpredictability of these artificial entities like potential autonomy "due to a common misunderstanding of the very concept of person, in which personhood would be a quality that derives from a shared human nature or human essence" (Silva, 2017, p. 113), and the compressed living space because of the a post-human society with resource shortages. Therefore, conflicts is inevitable during communication and interaction between the humans and the artificial persons.

On a psychological level, humanity's anxiety and hostility towards technological development may drive them to wonder whether "genetically altered humanB beings may have enhanced physical and mental capacities will enable them to be capable of personal agency and the self-restraint that involves. Or, will their enhanced capacities lead to an unbridled hubris?" (Wennemann, 2013, p. 93). Out of anthropocentristic thoughts, humans can not tolerate the inferior "animal" surpassing them. Meanwhile, artificial persons' enhanced capacities also overwhelm humans. Kanya, a character in *The Windup Girl*, is one of the best examples of showing human arrogance towards artificial persons who regard only genetic humans can have personhood. Kanya is hostile to the windups, acknowledging they are "unnatural" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 286) because they are all grown in test tubes. She takes it for granted that the windups have no souls and karma because there are no rebirths for them, neglecting the fact that it is humans who are deprived of their capacity for reproduction.

When Kanya hearing the news of Emiko destroys their Queen's protector, she is shocked and a sense of running out of control stirs her deep-seated distrust and hatred toward artificial persons. She never tries to find out the driving force of Emiko's heretical action, only eager to bring Emiko to justice: human justice. When Kanya knows she needs the help of another windup girl, Hiroko, to kill Emiko, though she is overwhelmed by the enhanced capacity of the windups, Kanya still shows her scorn for the other, she shrugs: "If that's true, then I have a use for you. If not, I would just as soon compost you with the rest of the daily dung collection. Your master insists that you will be useful, though I can't think how" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p.286) neglecting Hiroko "looks away, across the water to her factories on the far side" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 286), a sign of one's feeling has been hurt. From the anthropocentrism perspective, Kanya naturally considers the windups as tools, even useless tools. Though the windups show their personhood behind her, she still stubbornly insists on her ontological beliefs.

For societal reasons, the conflict between humans and artificial persons primarily manifests in social competitions, such as material resources and living space.

The scarcity of resources in the posthuman era exacerbates competition between humans and artificial persons for essential needs like food and water. Emiko's skin is designed very smoothly to meet the aesthetic value and practical needs because the masters of the windups for service purposes are of high class, and the temperature of their living circumstances is warm and cozy. Her pores are so small that she needs ice water to keep cool, or her skin will be painfully impermeable, and her brain will lose awareness because of the overheats after intense activity, and she is able to think. However, buying a windup ice is considered expensive and unworthy. Even if Emiko is in dire need of water, humans may still choose to ignore or refuse her request, believing that Emiko does not deserve access to these resources. For example, when Anderson suggests Raleigh go get Emiko some ice due to Emiko's expressions of discomfort, Raleigh replies, "It's not time for her next round. And she's got a show coming up" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 42). The human interests are often put behind the life of the windups. For humans, the windups can only be exploited by them, and cannot request from them.

Beyond material resources, competition between the two also exists in living spaces like shelters, employment opportunities, and power spaces. The Murderbot's room in the station is a security ready room, "which was where weapons, ammo, perimeter alarms, drones, and all the other supplies pertaining to security were stored, including me" (Wells, 2017, p. 18). The SecUnit has no power to possess its own properties because its own is regarded as property like other material resources of humans. Nobody had asked Murderbot what it needs, though people and artificial persons live together, because "it would be a stupid waste of resources, namely me" (Wells, 2017, p. 18). Thus, the storage becomes an appropriate shelter for placing properties like SecUnit. In *Ancillary Justice*, there are instance where humans express their resentment toward artificial beings concerning the competition for employment opportunities. In dangerous or uninhabitable places like those frozen for centuries, humans will send ancillaries there. However, when situations are bettered However, people in power like Lieutenant Awn want to replace One Esk with a human unit because "Ancillaries can stay in suspension indefinitely... It doesn't make sense to have ancillaries out of the holds doing work when there are human soldiers who could do it" (Leckie, 2013, p. 16). Confronting the skepticism put by the head priest towards some sick amusement of human soldiers like humiliation or sexual assault, Lieutenant Awn sits, distressed and unable to answer. Though sometimes people feel uncomfortable with the indifference of artificial persons, human soldiers are more dangerous and stay in suspension. Moreover, the power struggle is mainly out of human suspicion. In *The Windup Girl*s, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Trade fight viciously for power. Each faction blames the other for the death of the Queen's protector, Somdet Chaopraya, taking advantage of the death of the most powerful man in the country as a pretext for launching a coup. Neither side considers the possibility that the artificial being they despise, Emiko, has personhood (and Emiko had no intention of becoming a killer) and killed Chaopraya in response to the abuse she suffered. They are heading down the wrong path of mutual distrust. Humans, who pride themselves on being superior beings, carry out barbaric acts against those they view as "other"; trapped in anthropocentrism, they refuse to acknowledge that other species may possess personhood.

Faced with the challenges of human dominance in various sectors that capabilities of artificial persons may rival or surpass those of humans, the anxiety and rage of humans is further fueling. Thus, out of ontological considerations, they dehumanize artificial persons with moral personhood through othering, restriction and violation, to mask their discrimination and fear. Humans perceive or pretend to recognize artificial persons as inherently inferior, believing they are incapable of truly understanding or empathizing with human emotions and the cultural context. Through social stare and a series of systemic educational and indoctrination processes, artificial beings are othered, marginalized, and excluded from the sphere of human identity and rights.

The Murderbot can clearly feel a sense of prying and scrutinizing behind a human's stare. It knows human clients "usually like to pretend I'm a robot" (Wells, 2017, p. 27). Denying the personhood of artificial beings allows humans to guiltlessly enjoy their sacrifices, even when it means the loss of artificial beings' lives. This is why the Murderbot "prefer wearing the armor, even inside the habitat where it's unnecessary and can just get in the way" (Wells, 2017, p. 27), to escape from human's stare which consciously or unconsciously othering it and makes it feel much easier. Under these circumstances, the Muerderbot also pretends itself as a heartless murderer who does not have personhood so it can neglect its emotions, rationalize people's apathy toward it and objectify itself to satisfy humans' commands. Emiko is programmed and trained with Japanese expression and behavior to serve her Japanese masters better. Japanese even have a saying: "New People are more Japanese than the Japanese" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 285). The first master, Gendo-sama, says to Emiko she is more than human and she shall not be ashamed of being a New People. As a cherished artificial person, Emiko replies "No. I am not ashamed" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 33) but the long-time dehumanizing training makes her understand she is made in Japan, she is not a Japanese. Though she looks like Japanese, speaks Japanese' tongue, Kyoto is not her home (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 35). The saying "New People are more Japanese than the Japanese" only works when describing the New People's appearance. After being abandoned in Bangkok, her former pride has become others' target of ridicule. People in Thailand "all laugh and point at the Japanese windup and her broken unnatural steps" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 35), she is never a New People with personhood, but an "animal" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 37). Breq also expresses the same lament. Although she is made by Radchaai, she knows she is not Radchaai, "you have to be human to be Radchaai" (Leckie, 2013, p. 4) and the Radch Empire is "home that had never been home, for me" (Leckie, 2013, p. 283).

Thus, the word human is filled with xenophobia. "Artificially manufactured persons" are designed to serve humans but are not granted social recognition, identity, or belonging within the human community. Consequently, restrictive measures are imposed to ensure the "purity" of personhood of humanB as identified by Daryl J. Wennemann from the biological sense and to maintain the dominant position in the power structure. Emiko is derived the reproduction capacity lest the New People proliferate uncontrollably and pose a threat to human society. The Murderbot is scrutinized by HubSystem and has to download a package to strengthen the system's control. Breq's human body is transformed into "equipment" (Leckie, 2013, p. 2), becoming an appendage to a ship's AI. Except for technological restrictions, artificial persons also suffer from violent suppression and abuse, some of which are solely to satisfy humans' twisted desires. After being abandoned in Bangkok, Emiko is forced to stage obscene performances and subjected to sexual abuse. The connection between the ship and a new human body may extremely torturing, because it's all depend on the mercy of tech medic whether give a tranquilizer to the transformer or not. During the process, all the ancillaries would share the pain and terror with each other. The connection between the ship and a new human body may extremely torturous because it's all depends on the mercy of a tech medic whether to give a tranquilizer to the transformer or not. During the process, all the ancillaries would share the pain and terror with each other. The medic who connects the new body with *Justice of Toren* is apparently not of the merciful kind. Breq says: "This particular tech medic didn't care much about my comfort. She wasn't obliged to care, of course (Leckie, 2013, p. 171)". The medic does not acknowledge Breq as human but "a part of the ship" (Leckie, 2013, p. 171). If artificial humans do not encounter kind masters, they have to struggle for a living like slaves.

Thus, human beings' paradoxical mindset not only reflects the arrogance of anthroMpocentrism which marginalizes and excludes artificial persons as the other, but also demonstrates the anxiety and fear of the the sense of loss of control over technological development and the series of societal issues that accompany it. Artificial persons possess the potential for having personhood. But out of ontological thought, humans disregard the possibility that artificial persons may belong to humanM. For artificial persons with personhood, human beings' indifferent and hostile emotions and unjust and endless exploitation and oppression will provoke their resistance.

Encountered with endless derogatory comments and exclusionary gaze, Emiko's personhood are strengthened. She constantly reminds herself: "You are not a dog... You are not a servant. Service has gotten you abandoned amongst demons in a city of divine beings. If you act like a servant, you will die like a dog. (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 150)" As self-consciousness fully awakens, Emiko says to herself: "I will not die like an animal. I will fight them. (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 278)" Emiko ultimately relied on her own strength to kill her oppressor, escape to freedom, and seek the life she longed for. Confronted with Dr. Gurathin's provocation, the Murderbot's rage became uncontrollable. After the ineffective verbal threats, it even wants to resort to violent intimidation against Dr. Gurathin. Realizing that blind submission only led to oppression, Breq resolutely chose to rebel. During the early days of its interaction with the amnesiac Seivarden, Breq mirrors the manner Seivarden had treated it and commands Seivarden as a servant. While fighting against the tyrannical Anaander Mianaai, Breq set its mind to

resist until death.

In a nutshell, artificial persons are feared and mistreated because humans hold ontological thoughts. Humans fear "staying behind" (Silva, 2017, p. 122), and their resources and advantages may be stripped away. Meanwhile, artificial persons are tired of human beings' othering gaze and terrified of violent restrictions, and some of them choose to resist. However, an eye for an eye only leads to more violence and suffering. Such a conflicting situation is deeply problematic, and human beings should reconsider their attitudes toward artificial persons, striving to rebuild a society where humans and artificial beings can feel a sense of belonging.

4. THE DEATH OF THE FLAWED GOD: THE AUTOPOIETIC AND OPEN POSTHUMAN SOCIETY

Considering contemporary social development, humans' persistent repression of artificial beings is neither ethically justifiable nor practically feasible. Juli L. Gittinger argues that personhood, much like gender, is socially constructed through interactions with others (2019, p. 26). When artificially manufactured beings who have moral personhood are aware that their personhood has long been suppressed and that their identity as non-human animals are constructed by human beings, a heavy desolation will settle over them. Moreover, when they realize human beings are far from perfect, concerning to cognition and physical capabilities, humans are inherently weakened compared to the enhanced artificially manufactured beings, they will inevitably be regarded as the "Flawed God" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 327), and the anger in artificial human's heart will be further kindled.

The term "Flawed God" stems from Emiko's address to human beings. When Emiko realizes that the treatment she endures in human society is not predestined but rather unjust oppression, she perceives herself as a sibling to Cheshire: "sympathetic creatures, manufactured by the same flawed gods" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 327). Created on a whim, to be brutally discarded once it not uncontrolled by human beings. By referring to humans as the "Flawed Gods", Emiko articulates sharp insight into her predicament: Her creators fashioned her, exploited her, and ultimately abandoned her not due to any inherent deficiency of her but simply because she could no longer serve the interests of her gods. Yet if humanity were truly divine, how could it so carelessly forsake its own creation? Left with no choice, Emiko resolves to commit deicide in self-defense. However, such an outcome is not inevitable.

Since humanism is its own dogma, replete with its own prejudices and assumptions, the nature of posthumanist thought must change (Wolfe, 2010, p. xiv). As Cary Wolfe contends, society is an increasingly complex autopoietic system, continuously evolving to sustain itself (Wolfe, 2010, p. xxi). The social milieus in science fiction manifests escalating complexity. As artificial beings ceaselessly fight for autonomy and independence, human beings, as an integral part of the social system cohabiting with artificial beings, must acknowledge the problematic situations led by their ontological thoughts. The concept of personhood needs to be reconstructed, which requires a rejection of anthroMpocentrism. Nowadays, the boundary of personhood should not be static, which is only limited to homo sapiens, but need to be more open and extended to non-human entities to facilitate both internal and external complexity within the social system, fostering continuous progress and ultimately enabling the harmonious coexistence of humans and artificial beings.

When recognizing Emiko's capacity for independent thought, the white farang Anderson consistently respected her autonomy, protecting her and eventually developing deep affection for her. In turn, Emiko gradually rebuilt the trust that had been shattered by human betrayal. During Anderson's final moments, she takes care of Anderson, "squeezed water into his mouth from a cloth and he sucked at it like a baby before he finally expired" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 336). As the Divine City was submerged by rising waters, Emiko encountered Dr. Gibbons, who addressed her as "young lady" and expressed his willingness to help her overcome the genetic modifications that deprived her reproductive ability. He offers his kinds to assist Emiko in creating a new future for her and others like her, implying that she could become the mother of a new genetically engineered species. By saying "Someday, perhaps, all people will be New People and you will look back on us as we now look back at the poor Neanderthals" (Bacigalupi, 2009, p. 339), Gibbons shows his open attitude towards an more inclusive posthumanist society. In aiding Emiko, he also found new fighting goal in his aimless life.

After overthrowing Anaander Mianaai's tyranny alongside her human companions, unexpectedly, Breq is hoped by her human friends took on the position of captain, a role traditionally reserved for humans, especially distinguished humans. She is shocked and heartfully moved: "I can't be a captain. I'm not a citizen. I'm not even human (Leckie, 2013, p. 378)". Breq ultimately accepts the captaincy and continues to work alongside humans to

protect the galaxy and its inhabitants. Her actions demonstrate a sense of responsibility that transcends her programmed directives, embodying Leckie's hopeful vision of a future where artificial beings and humans coexist and build a shared community together.

Even though the Murderbot is no longer under the HubSystem's control, it still hold high responsibility towards its work and human collegues. When the team members debated whether artificial beings possessed humanity, Volescu argued, "But I think the fact that the Unit has been acting to preserve our lives, to take care of us, while it was a free agent, gives us even more reason to trust it. (Wells, 2017, p. 80)" Feeling respected by the team members, the Murderbot's dedication to its duties is more than required. After the crisis is resolved, Dr. Mensah purchased the Murderbot from the company. More importantly, she honored the Murderbot's autonomy, allowing it to become a truly independent free agent. Through its interactions with Dr. Mensah and the members of PreservationAux, their kindness and respect gradually nurtured its trust in and affection for humans, reinforcing its emergent sense of personhood.

The ideas of nature and culture or technique are intertwined (Silva, 2017, p. 118). Artificial beings play a crucial role in advancing human society, and the continuous development of artificial entities is inevitable and necessary. Blind fear or outright denial of this progress is irrational and futile. An adequate approach to personhood demands taking the role of alterity seriously and abandoning an anthropocentric perspective. As the term "anthropodecentrism" proposed by Roberto Marchesini signifies, human beings need to remove the category of man from its claimed central position in the universe (Silva, 2017, p. 117). Human beings need to hold an ongoing and immanent belief in the possibility of artificial beings having personhood to adapt to the increasingly complex environment, which will promote the harmonious coexistence of technology and the humanities, allowing both humans and artificial beings to live together in equality, mutual respect, trust, and collaboration.

5. CONCLUSION

The posthuman works of *The Windup Girl*, *Ancillary Justice*, and *All Systems Red* serve as a cipher through which the increasingly indistinct demarcations between the human and the machinic within the posthumanist trajectory are unpacked. These narratives foreground the phenomenon wherein certain "artificially manufactured persons" are manifesting attributes traditionally ascribed to human personhood, challenging the primacy of anthropocentric exceptionalism and ontological hierarchies. This paper advocates for a paradigmatic shift away from the anthropocentric bias that has historically underpinned conceptions of moral personhood, suggesting instead an ontological pluralism that accommodates the multifarious forms of being.

The recognition of the moral personhood of artificial entities represents a critical juncture in reconfiguring the interstitial relationship between humans and "artificially manufactured persons" as well as in cultivating a sustainable schema for human-machine sympoiesis. The decentering of anthropocentric thought necessitates an ontological humility that acknowledges the intrinsic, natural variances between "artificially manufactured persons" and humans. These entities, while crafted and enhanced for particularized functions, are fundamentally divergent from human ontology; their essence does not require a mimetic approximation of humanity. Nevertheless, as products of human ingenuity, they possess the capacity for personhood, which demands ethical consideration and moral recognition. It is imperative that humans extend respect, trust, and collaborative engagement to these artificial beings, transcending the binary oppositions that have historically structured human-machine relations. By adopting a more expansive and inclusive conceptualization of coexistence, society can pivot toward an autopoietic posthuman society, wherein the convergences of technological and biological intelligences are harmonized. This vision of a future society eschews the dichotomous thinking that has undergirded traditional humanism, embracing instead a fluid and dynamic interplay between the artificial and the organic, the human and the non-human, thereby paving the way for a more equitable and ethically robust posthuman world.

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